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Mortgage put options and real estate markets 
 
In this paper we offer direct evidence that financial intermediation does impact 
underlying asset markets.  We develop a specific observable symptom of a banking system 
that underprices the put option imbedded in non-recourse asset-backed lending.  Using a 
dataset for 19 countries and over 500 real estate investment trusts, we find that, following a 
negative demand shock, the “underpricing” economies experience far deeper asset market 
crashes than economies in which the put option is correctly priced.     
Keywords:  real estate bubble, mortgage lending put options, Asian financial crisis 
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1. Introduction 
All non-recourse asset-backed mortgage loans contain a put option that allows the 
borrower, through default, to “sell” the asset to the lender for the outstanding mortgage 
balance.  The default spread compensates the lender for this put option.  If correctly priced, 
the imbedded put option has no impact on asset markets.  If, however, the put is 
underpriced, efficient asset markets incorporate this mistake into the transaction price of the 
asset.  This leads to inflated asset prices above their fundamental level.1 
The subprime mortgage crisis and the recent price boom in the US, now reversed, is 
the most recent example of a price bubble associated with lax and expanding access to 
credit.  The concern that price rises in the US were artificially fuelled by new and exotic 
mortgage instruments that embody overly liberal lending standards led to an advisory of 
caution in the use of these instruments in September, 2006.2  This paper does not offer a 
mechanism to measure the extent of a market bubble before they burst, but it does offer a 
mechanism to examine the impact of lending practices prevalent in the market on their 
potential severity.   
The contribution of this paper is twofold.  First, utilizing the theory of Pavlov and 
Wachter (2004, 2006), we develop a specific and observable symptom of underpricing of 
non-recourse asset backed lending (discussed in Section 2) .  Our symptom distinguishes 
between rational changes in the lending spread and those associated with the underpricing 
                                                 
1 See Allen and Gale (1998 and 1999) and Pavlov and Wachter (2002, 2005) for models that show how 
underpricing of the put option leads to inflated asset prices.   
2 See “Interagency Guidance on Nontraditional Mortgage Product Risks” 
(http://www.federalreserve.gov/BoardDocs/SRLetters/2006/SR0615a2.pdf)  
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of the put option.  We show the second is associated with unsustainable price rises and, 
therefore, deeper crashes. 
While the literature has associated underpricing with rising asset prices, in this 
paper we develop a specific symptom of underpricing in mortgage markets and develop a 
model to show that this symptom is associated with price rises in efficient equity markets 
only when there is underpricing of the put option.  Our symptom distinguishes between 
rational changes in the lending spread and those associated with the underpricing of the put 
option.  We show the second is associated with unsustainable price rises and, therefore, 
deeper crashes.   
 Second, using data from 19 countries and over 500 individual real estate investment 
trusts and property companies, we empirically find, as we would expect, that following a 
negative demand shock, markets which exhibit the symptom of underpricing tend to 
experience far deeper market crashes than markets that do not exhibit the symptom.  
Following a negative demand shock, the asset prices in an economy which experiences 
underpricing have to fall far enough not only to reflect the new supply and demand 
conditions but also to eliminate the prior credit-induced price rise.  Therefore, economies 
that experience underpricing, while not necessarily subject to a higher risk of market 
crashes, are subject to deeper crashes, all else equal, when they occur.   
This finding is direct evidence that financial intermediation does impact the 
underlying asset markets if the intermediaries misprice the loans they provide.  
Intermediaries’ misaligned incentives, such as focus on short-term results and market share, 
government-sponsored deposit insurance and/or bailout tendencies, and/or takeover barriers 
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make underpriced lending in any sector possible and even likely.  This problem is 
compounded for real estate-backed mortgage lending because of lack of proper pricing 
data, heterogeneity of the underlying assets, and prolonged price cycles.  In this paper we 
document, both theoretically and empirically, that loan underpricing does impact the 
underlying markets, even if these markets are efficient. 
Furthermore, we find no relationship between our measure of underpricing and the 
size of the market decline using data after the decline.  This suggests that, as expected, our 
theory only holds before the market crash.   
This study develops an economic indicator, or symptom, of loan underpricing.  It 
does not address the issue of why underpricing might occur and how to prevent it.  For a 
detailed discussing of the causes and potential remedies of underpricng please refer to 
Pavlov and Wachter (2004, 2006) and Herring and Wachter (1999).   
This study is distinct from the literature which estimates the fundamental price of an 
asset directly and detects asset price inflation by comparing the estimated to the observed 
price.3  Rather the specific and observable symptom of underpricing that we develop here is 
likely to be found in an economy in which asset bubbles are being supported by lending 
behavior.  In addition to finding support for the theory, the findings give policy makers and 
market participants a measurable symptom of underpricing.  If such underpricing is 
suspected, policy makers and regulators can take steps to eliminate it or at least contain its 
market-wide impact: both lenders and market participants can take measures to prepare for 
                                                 
3 See for instance Smith, Smith, and Thompson (2005) for a direct estimation of real estate values in Los 
Angeles.  Other studies and popular articles on the fundamental real estate values include Case and Shiller 
(2003), Krainer and Wei (2004), Krugman (2005), Leamer (2002), McCarthy and Peach (2004), and Shiller 
(2005), Edelstein (2005) and Edelstein, Dokko, Lacayo, and Lee (1999), among others. 
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or hedge the expected increased magnitude of future price declines should a negative 
demand shock occur.  Indeed while underpriced lending may not initiate unsustainable 
“asset bubbles” thereby causing market crashes, the underpricing of risk makes these 
crashes worse.     
Koh, et. al. (2006) investigate the mortgage lending institutional arrangements 
across countries to directly assess the likelihood of an economy entering an underpricing 
equilibrium.  Consistent with the results reported here, they find that lending industry 
institutional mechanisms that are prone to underpricing tend to exacerbate market crashes. 
This study provides support for the recent sentiment arguments put forward in 
Clayton, Ling, and Naranjo (2007).  They examine the time-series and cross-sectional 
variation in MSA-level cap rates by measuring investment sentiment.  Such sentiment is a 
source of market inefficiency and, as demonstrated by Herring and Wachter (1999), is 
unlikely to be sustainable without supportive lending policies.   
We proceed as follows.  Section 2 develops the symptom of underpricing and 
formulates the testable empirical implication discussed above.  Section 3 describes the data, 
presents the main results, and provides robustness analysis utilizing various controls and 
econometric tests.  Section 4 concludes with policy implications and direction for future 
research. 
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2.  The Symptom of Underpricing 
The spread between duration-matched bank lending and deposit rates for a non-
recourse loan is the value of the imbedded put option.4  There are two reasons for the 
lending spread to fall.  First, the default spread can narrow because the expected future 
asset price volatility falls, which, in turn, reduces the value of the put option.  This is a 
rational reason to reduce the lending spread and has no impact on asset prices.  Note that a 
change in the volatility of the asset has no impact on the asset price if investors are 
diversified.5  We address the possibility that investors are not diversified below. 
The second reason lending spreads narrow is that lenders underprice the default 
risk.  This increases asset prices because rational investors take advantage of the 
underpriced non-recourse lending even if they are fully diversified.   
The transaction price of an asset financed through a non-recourse loan is the 
composite of the fundamental value of the asset, V, the value of the mortgage loan, M, and 
the face value of the adjustable-rate mortgage loan, B: 
 ( ) ( , ( ))P V M s Bσ σ σ= − + , (1) 
where σ denotes the expected future volatility of the asset and s denotes the spread of 
lending over deposit rates.  This spread compensates the lender for the put option imbedded 
in the non-recourse mortgage.  If the mortgage is priced correctly, its market value equals 
                                                 
4 The lending spread also covers the bank’s operating costs, but these are relatively small and constant 
throughout the market cycle. 
5 If investors are diversified, only covariance with the overall economy affects the price of the asset.  (see for 
instance Sharpe, 1964).  Even if the fortunes of real estate markets have an impact on the overall economy, 
changes in asset volatility will have a smaller, second-order effect on the asset price when compared to the 
effect on an underpricied option to default.   
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its face value, and the transaction price equals the fundamental value of the asset.  If the 
mortgage is mispriced, then the transaction price reflects not only the fundamental value of 
the asset, but also the mispricing of the mortgage, ( , ( ))B M sσ σ− .  If the market value of 
the mortgage is below the face value of the mortgage, then the transaction price exceeds the 
fundamental value of the asset because efficient equity markets take advantage of the 
mispricing and the asset is assumed to be of fixed supply.   
If the lending spread, s, changes in response to σ,  
 
0
0
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P V M M s V
s
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σ σ σ σ σ
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>
∂
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∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
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Since the spread adjusts to compensate the lender for the changes in the value of the 
put option imbedded in the mortgage loan, 0M M s
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∂ ∂ ∂
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σ
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∂
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∂
, but still relatively small.6   
The response of the asset price to the spread is: 
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σ σ
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∂ ∂∂ ∂ ∂= = ≈
∂ ∂∂
∂ ∂
 (3) 
                                                 
6The price impact of real estate volatility changes through the covariance with the overall market are likely to 
be far smaller then the impact through changing the value of the option to default. 
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Therefore, the correlation between transaction prices and lending spread is zero if 
the increase in asset volatility is fully diversifiable, and close to zero if it affects the 
covariance between the asset and the overall market. 
If, on the other hand, the spread changes because of underpricing, not in response to 
changes in expected future asset volatility, the response of the price to the spread is very 
different: 
 0, 0, 0s V M
s sσ
∂ ∂ ∂
= = >
∂ ∂ ∂
, (4) 
therefore, 
 0P V M M
s s s s
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
= − = − <
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
. (5) 
Thus, the correlation between asset prices and lending spread is negative and driven 
by the sensitivity of the value of the mortgage to the lending spread, which is substantial. 
The above differential impact of default spread on asset prices produces the 
following symptom of underpricing:  
Underpricing of the default risk in non-recourse lending produces a negative 
correlation between asset returns and changes in the default spread.  Correctly 
pricing the default risk in non-recourse lending produces no correlation between 
asset returns and changes in the default spread. 
Following an asset market negative demand shock, “underpricing” economies 
experience deeper market crashes because the new asset price not only reflects the new 
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supply and demand conditions, but also eliminates the price rises due to underpricing.  This 
leads to the following empirical implication: 
Economies that experience underpricing (i.e., have a negative correlation between 
asset returns and changes in the default spread), can be expected to experience 
larger market crashes, all else equal, following negative demand shocks. 
Narrowing of the lending spread is not sufficient evidence of underpricing or asset 
price inflation.  Instead, we need to observe a negative correlation between the lending 
spread and asset prices to suspect underpricing.  Moreover to determine whether the 
phenomenon of underpricing is contributing to higher asset prices we need to observe a 
positive relationship, all else equal, between the correlation and asset price rises.  While 
theoretically appealing, this approach does limit the practical applicability of our symptom 
as a tool to detect and combat underpricing.  Estimating the correlation requires a number 
of observations and introduces a substantial time lag between the start of underpricing and 
its detection.  Nonetheless, a measurable symptom is useful for countries and markets that 
track and report lending activity and asset prices in a timely fashion.  Absent the symptom 
we propose here, even these markets may not be able to detect underpricing before a market 
crash occurs.  Thus we develop and implement a test for whether underpricing contributes 
to asset price inflation based on the statistically significant joint presence of price rises and 
a negative correlation of the narrowing of the lending spread with asset price rises across 
countries, using an international database of property returns.  Furthermore, we test the 
sequential presence of negative correlation and large price declines following a negative 
demand shock.  We also test the absence of negative correlation in all markets following a 
negative demand shock. 
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Finally, if investors are not diversified, the changes in expected future asset 
volatility will impact the asset prices.  This, in turn, could produce the negative correlation 
between asset returns and changes in the lending spread.  However, in this case economies 
that exhibit the negative correlation will not exhibit larger market crashes than economies 
that do not.  If anything, the possibility that the marginal investor in a particular country is 
not diversified would bias our findings towards zero.   
3. Empirical Support 
To test the above theoretical predictions we need, at the minimum, property return 
data and the spread of lending over deposit rates for a number of countries and property 
types.  Duration-matched lending and deposit rates are available from the World Bank.7  
The theoretical framework above refers to the default spread, which is only one component 
of the lending spread.  Thus, our empirical analysis assumes that the remaining components 
of the lending spread, such as prepayment options and servicing costs, remain unchanged 
throughout the business cycle.8  Furthermore, we need to assume that changes in the 
lending over deposit spreads in the economy are representative of changes in the real estate 
mortgage lending rate over the deposit rate spread.9 
In this paper we utilize is the Global Property Research Indices (GPR) described in 
Eichholtz (1996).  These data include property indices for 25 countries over 20 and 12 
                                                 
7 World Bank World Economic Indicators CD-ROM. 
8 In fact, virtually all commercial loans contain substantial prepayment penalties, so the option to prepay is 
not worth very much. 
9 In addition to the deposit rate, one could use measures of the default spread based on the cost of capital for 
the lender or other risk-free securities, such as Treasuries.  In this analysis we use deposit rates primarily 
because they are measured precisely and available for all countries in our sample.  
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years for developed and emerging countries, respectively.  We utilize the GPR Genral 
database, which includes 543 international REITs and property companies.   
This data set has a number of advantages.  In particular, it has the deepest history 
and the largest cross-sectional span across the globe of any real estate property database.  
Since the returns are based on publicly traded and liquid securities, the data quality is high, 
and is consistent through time.  Table 1 provides a summary statistic of the data, including 
the number of REITs available in each country.   
The most direct test of the theoretical model described above is a negative 
relationship between the correlation of the change in lending spread and asset returns 
before the crash and the total price decline during the crash for each market.  Figures 1 and 
2 depict scatter plots of all included observations.  The correlation is computed using a 5-
year window in Figure 1, and using all available data in Figure 2.  The horizontal axis 
depicts the correlation between asset price changes, excluding dividends, in local currency, 
and the change in lending over deposit rate spread before the respective market crash.  The 
vertical axis reports the percent decline, from top to bottom, during the most recent market 
crash for each country.  In some cases this decline spanned only a few months, while for 
others it took a year or two.  Therefore, the vertical axis depicts the total decline, not 
annualized or adjusted for the time frame it took for prices to adjust. 
Our theory predicts that a large negative correlation between asset returns and 
changes in lending spreads is a symptom of loan underpricing.  Loan underpricing results in 
asset price inflation.  Countries that experience loan underpricing (and asset overpricing) 
before their negative demand shock tend to experience far greater price declines during 
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their market crash.  Consistent with this, countries such as Singapore, Malaysia, Belgium, 
and Sweden exhibit a large negative correlation between asset returns and changes in the 
lending spread before their respective crashes.  These same countries experienced very 
large price declines following their negative demand shocks, of 50 to 85%.  Economies like 
The Netherlands, New Zealand, and Switzerland exhibited no or positive correlation 
between asset returns and lending spreads.  These countries, therefore, did not exhibit the 
symptom of loan underpricing developed in Section 2.  While they also experienced 
negative demand shocks, their price declines were relatively more modest, between 10 and 
40%.  As a robustness check, we perform this regression by excluding all observations one 
at a time, and all possible combinations of two observations at a time.  The slope coefficient 
remains significant at the 5% level in all of these regressions.  In other words, there is no 
one observation or a combination of two observations whose removal substantially 
influences our results.  These findings are consistent with the theory that a negative 
correlation between asset returns and changes in lending spreads is a symptom of 
underpricing, and that underpricing exacerbates market downturns. 
Pavlov and Wachter (2004, 2006) suggest that after a negative demand shock there 
should be no relationship between the correlation of asset price changes and deposit spreads 
on one hand and the size of the market decline, on the other.  We compute our symptom of 
underpricing, i.e., the correlation between asset returns and changes in the lending spread, 
following the negative demand shock in each country.   Figures 3 and 4 display these 
estimates using 5-year windows and all available data, respectively.  Following the negative 
demand shock, there is no relationship between the correlation of asset returns and changes 
in the lending spread and the magnitude of the previous crash.  As a robustness check, 
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excluding one or two observations at a time does not generate a statistically significant 
relationship either.   
Finally, we repeat the above analysis at the individual REIT level.  Figures 5 and 6 
provide scatter plots of the correlation between asset price changes and changes in the 
default spread versus the size of the market decline.  Figure 5 reports the data using 5-year 
window to compute the correlations, while Figure 6 uses all available data.  Both results 
strongly suggest that funds that seem to be able to take advantage of loan underpricing 
experience larger price declines following negative demand shocks.  While we also report 
the regression estimates of these results, we note that the observations are not strictly 
independent, as REITs within a country tend to be highly correlated.   
Figures 7 and 8 report the correlation versus the magnitude of price declines using 
data after the price decline.  These two figures are analogous to Figures 3 and 4, except 
they use REIT-level data.  Again, as predicted by the theory, there is no relationship 
between the correlation and the magnitude of price declines.   
4. Summary and Policy Conclusions 
In this paper we develop a specific and observable symptom of loan underpricing in 
the economy.  This symptom is based on the relationship between changes in the lending 
spread and changes in asset prices.  If the put option in non-recourse loans is underpriced, 
then we expect this correlation to be negative, as narrowing spreads are an indicator of 
underpricing which is taken into account by equity investors.   
While this economic indicator of underpricing is unable to detect market bubbles 
before they burst, it does allow us to examine the impact of lending practices prevalent in 
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the market on the underlying property markets, especially when those market bubbles burst.  
We find that countries that experience severe underpricing also experience far deeper 
market declines, when those declines occur.  This is an intuitive finding, as the post-crash 
asset price needs reflect not only the new, lower, demand fundamentals, but also eliminate 
the impact loan underpricing had pre-crash.   
By any measure, mid-2000’s real-estate markets in many countries around the globe 
appear to have been at, or above, their historic highs; nonetheless it is very difficult to 
accurately detect a real-estate bubble. While we offer no remedy to this predicament, there 
are historical precedents around the globe that do provide some insights for evaluating real 
estate markets around the world.  If there is one thing that the most severe real-estate 
bubbles have had in common, it is easy access to low-cost credit.  When this happens, real-
estate investors and homeowners take advantage of it and bid up land prices above their 
fundamental levels. While this may or may not start a market price bubble, it certainly 
enables the bubble formation and makes it worse.  If the lending standards in this type of 
environment are lax, or weakened further, in order to increase profits for lenders, the risk of 
a bubble is heightened.  The bubble then bursts when market prices exceed the fundamental 
values of the underlying properties by so much that even virtually costless financing cannot 
generate more demand. 
The more reckless the lending industry is, the longer the bubble can survive, and the 
harder it bursts. For instance, we find in this paper that the lending sector was a major 
contributor to the real-estate price bubble in the mid-1990s in countries such as Thailand, 
Malaysia, and Indonesia. Conversely, other economies, such as Switzerland and Hong 
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Kong,  maintained far more restrictive lending practices, and, we find that the lending 
sector did not contribute to the price inflation in these countries.  While all of the countries 
in our study experienced deep price declines during their respective crisis, these declines 
were two to three times more severe in the countries where access to funds for real-estate 
development or ownership was unrestricted and very cheap.  
Empirical evidence from earlier real-estate market bubbles across the globe also 
seems to strongly support this idea. In a recent case, John Laker, Chairman of the 
Australian Prudential Regulatory Authority, suggested that lax lending standards in 
Australia  contributed to Australia's real-estate boom.  In response, the Regulatory 
Authority implemented steps to strengthen bank lending standards to prevent further price 
inflation due to excessive availability of funds. Similarly, as noted above, in response to 
historic price rises, a similar lending advisory was issued in the US.  Both of these were 
responses to eroding lending standards.  To the extent policies are in place and can prevent 
pro-cyclical easing of lending standards, this source of instability can be avoided.  This is 
difficult, since collateralized lending depends on loan-to-value ratios.  As we have shown in 
this paper, values can be artificially raised due to mortgage loan underpricing.  Thus, there 
is an inherit difficulty in developing and implementing such policies.  Nonetheless, it 
appears from our data, that some countries have been more successful than others in 
maintaining prudential lending standards.   
The bottom line is that we are still unable to detect market bubbles before they 
burst, but at least we can examine the impact of lending practices prevalent in the market 
on their potential severity.  Furthermore, the model shows the extent to which lending-
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industry regulators can mitigate the economic impact of a potential bubble by enforcing 
prudent lending standards. 
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Table 1:  Description of the data by country 
 
Countries No. of 
funds 
Included in 
regression: 
yes/no 
Experienced 
decline:  
yes/no 
Year of 
decline 
Total 
Decli
ne 
decline 
lasting  (in 
years) 
 Argentina  1 no* n/a 2001 ‐62% 2 
 Australia  41 yes yes 2000 ‐15% 1 
 Austria  12 no* n/a n/a n/a n/a 
 Belgium  13 yes yes 1997 ‐67% 4 
 Canada  43 yes yes 1998 ‐32% 1 
 France  58 yes yes 2000 ‐23% 2 
 Germany  17 yes yes 1991 ‐18% 4 
 Hong Kong  36 yes yes 1997 ‐30% 1 
 Ireland  2 yes yes 1999 ‐32% 3 
 Indonesia  6 yes yes 1997 ‐62% 3 
 Italy  9 yes yes 1995 ‐21% 4 
 Japan  60 yes yes 1997 ‐36% 1 
 United Kingdom  101 yes yes 1992 ‐25% 2 
 Malaysia  16 yes yes 1997 ‐69% 1 
 Mexico  2 no** n/a n/a n/a n/a 
 Netherlands  18 yes yes 1999 ‐25% 2 
 Norway  4 yes yes 1990 ‐11% 4 
 New Zealand  11 yes yes 1997 ‐25% 4 
 Portugal  3 no*** n/a n/a n/a n/a 
 Philippines  3 yes yes 2000 ‐19% 1 
 Spain  7 no*** n/a n/a ‐40% n/a 
 Singapore  28 yes yes 1997 ‐56% 1 
 Sweden  30 yes yes 1995 ‐58% 1 
 Switzerland  18 yes yes 1999 ‐19% 2 
 Thailand  4 no*** n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Total No. of Funds  543      
 
 *due to insufficiency of spread data  
 **due to unreliability of total return data   
 ***due to insufficiency of total return data  
 
Total Return Data for computing : 
- Data source : GPR General 
- 1980 Jan – 1996 Nov 
Spread is computed as the difference between lending and deposit rate 
- Date source: World Bank CD 
 
Table 1 provides the number of REITs by country and information on the timing of the 
REIT declines.
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Figure 1: Symptom of Loan Underpricing Vs. Total Market Decline (5-year window) 
 
The correlation is computed between the change in index value, excluding dividends, and 
the change in the spread of lending over deposit rates.  In this figure, we compute the 
correlation using 5-year window before each crash.  The vertical axis depicts the total 
percent decline in the property market, from top to bottom.  This is over one or more years 
and is specific for each country.  According to our theory, negative correlation is a 
symptom of loan underpricing (asset overpricing), and is associated with larger losses 
during a market downturn.  Countries that do not exhibit the symptom of loan underpricing 
have zero or positive correlation, and their respective property market declines are 
relatively modest.  
 
The statistics of the regression line are as follows: 
 
 Intercept Slope R2 
Estimate .29 -.25 .41 
t-statistic (8.03) (-3.48)  
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Figure 2: Symptom of Loan Underpricing Vs. Total Market Decline (all data) 
 
The correlation is computed between the change in index value, excluding dividends, and 
the change in the spread of lending over deposit rates.  In this figure, we compute the 
correlation using all available data before the crash, i.e., from the beginning of our data set 
to the peak of the property market.  The vertical axis depicts the total percent decline in the 
property market, from top to bottom.  This is over one or more years and is specific for 
each country.  According to our theory, negative correlation is a symptom of loan 
underpricing (asset overpricing), and is associated with larger losses during a market 
downturn.  Countries that do not exhibit the symptom of loan underpricing have zero or 
positive correlation, and their respective property market declines are relatively modest.  
 
The statistics of the regression line are as follows: 
 
 Intercept Slope R2 
Estimate .28 -.29 .21 
t-statistic (6.12) (-2.16)  
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Figure 3: Symptom of Underpricing Vs. Total Market Crash Decline (Using 5-year 
Window After the Crash) 
corelation vs decline(after crash)
y = 0.0446x + 0.3405
R2 = 0.0153
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The correlation is computed between change in index value, excluding dividends, and the 
change in the spread of lending over deposit rates.  In this figure, we compute the 
correlation using 5-year window after the crash.  The vertical axis depicts the total percent 
decline in the country index, from top to bottom.  This is over one or more years and is 
specific for each country.  As expected, we find no relationship between the correlation 
between asset returns and changes in lending spreads and the size of the decline. 
 
 
The statistics of the regression line are as follows: 
 
 Intercept Slope R2 
Estimate .34 .04 .02 
t-statistic (7.27) (.49)  
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Figure 4: Symptom of Underpricing Vs. Total Market Crash Decline (Using All Data 
After the Crash) 
corelation vs decline(after crash)
y = 0.0446x + 0.3405
R2 = 0.0153
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The correlation is computed between change in index value, excluding dividends, and the 
change in the spread of lending over deposit rates.  In this figure, we compute the 
correlation using all available data after the crash.  The vertical axis depicts the total 
percent decline in the country index, from top to bottom.  This is over one or more years 
and is specific for each country.  As expected, we find no relationship between the 
correlation between asset returns and changes in lending spreads and the size of the decline. 
 
 
The statistics of the regression line are as follows: 
 
 Intercept Slope R2 
Estimate .34 .07 .03 
t-statistic (7.38) (.73)  
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Figure 5: Symptom of Loan Underpricing Vs. Total Market Decline  
(REIT-level, 5-year window) 
corelation vs decline(before crash)
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This figure is analogous to Figure 1, except it uses REIT-level data to test our theory.  The 
correlation is computed between the change in REIT share value, excluding dividends, and 
the change in the spread of lending over deposit rates.  In this figure, we compute the 
correlation using 5-year window before each crash.  The vertical axis depicts the total 
percent decline in the property market, from top to bottom.  This is over one or more years 
and is specific for each country.  According to our theory, negative correlation is a 
symptom of loan underpricing (asset overpricing), and is associated with larger losses 
during a market downturn.  Countries that do not exhibit the symptom of loan underpricing 
have zero or positive correlation, and their respective property market declines are 
relatively modest.  
 
The statistics of the regression line are as follows: 
 
 Intercept Slope R2 
Estimate .39 -.2 .16 
t-statistic (21.13) (-5.06)  
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Figure 6: Symptom of Loan Underpricing Vs. Total Market Decline (all data) 
corelation vs decline(before crash) 
           y = ‐0.214x + 0.371
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This figure is analogous to Figure 2, except it uses REIT-level data to test our theory.  The 
correlation is computed between the change in REIT share value, excluding dividends, and 
the change in the spread of lending over deposit rates.  In this figure, we compute the 
correlation using all available data before each crash.  The vertical axis depicts the total 
percent decline in the property market, from top to bottom.  This is over one or more years 
and is specific for each country.  According to our theory, negative correlation is a 
symptom of loan underpricing (asset overpricing), and is associated with larger losses 
during a market downturn.  Countries that do not exhibit the symptom of loan underpricing 
have zero or positive correlation, and their respective property market declines are 
relatively modest.  
 
The statistics of the regression line are as follows: 
 
 Intercept Slope R2 
Estimate .37 -.21 .15 
t-statistic (19.45) (-4.91)  
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Figure 7: Symptom of Underpricing Vs. Total Market Crash Decline (Using 5-year 
Window After the Crash) 
corelation vs decline(after crash)
y = 0.047x + 0.430
      (0.73)        (14.69)    
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This figure is analogous to Figure 3, except it uses REIT-level data.  The correlation is 
computed between the change in REIT share price, excluding dividends, and the change in 
the spread of lending over deposit rates.  In this figure, we compute the correlation using 5-
year window after the crash.  The vertical axis depicts the total percent decline in the 
country index, from top to bottom.  This is over one or more years and is specific for each 
country.  As expected, we find no relationship between the correlation between asset 
returns and changes in lending spreads and the size of the decline. 
 
 
The statistics of the regression line are as follows: 
 
 Intercept Slope R2 
Estimate .43 .05 .01 
t-statistic (14.69) (.73)  
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Figure 8: Symptom of Underpricing Vs. Total Market Crash Decline (Using All Data 
After the Crash) 
corelation vs decline(after crash)
y = 0.016x + 0.424
       (0.24)         (14.44)  
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This figure is analogous to Figure 4, except it uses REIT-level data.  The correlation is 
computed between the change in REIT share price, excluding dividends, and the change in 
the spread of lending over deposit rates.  In this figure, we compute the correlation using all 
available data after the crash.  The vertical axis depicts the total percent decline in the 
country index, from top to bottom.  This is over one or more years and is specific for each 
country.  As expected, we find no relationship between the correlation between asset 
returns and changes in lending spreads and the size of the decline. 
 
 
The statistics of the regression line are as follows: 
 
 Intercept Slope R2 
Estimate .42 .,02 0 
t-statistic (14.44) (.24)  
 
 
 
